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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
CONFLICT OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS
BY EDWARD S. STIMSON
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
A-4Zska Packers' Association v. IndustrWia Accident Commission
of Californial presents again the troublesome problem of what
law governs the employer-employee relation.2 A corporation do-
ing business in both Alaska and California entered into a con-
tract of employment with one Palma, an alien, who was not a
resident of California. The contract was executed in California.
The corporation agreed to employ Palma in Alaska during the
salmon canning season and to transport him to Alaska and back
to San Francisco. The contract provided that as the only labor
was to be performed in Alaska and as the corporation had elected
to be bound by the provisions of the Alaska Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, the parties agreed to be bound by that act exclu-
sively. Palma was injured in the course of his employment in
Alaska. After returning to California he applied to the Industrial
Accident Commission of California for an award of compensation
under the California law. The California statute as interpreted
by the Supreme Court of California gives the Commission juris-
diction over controversies arising out of injuries received outside
of the state in cases where the contract of employment was made
in the state. It also provided that "No contract, rule or regula-
tion shall exempt the employer from liability for compensation
fixed by this act." The corporation defended on the ground that
the parties to the employment relation at the time of the injury
were subject to the law of Alaska and not to the law of California
and that the application of California law would violate the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and deny full faith
and credit to the Alaska law. The Commission awarded compen-
sation to Palma; the Supreme Court of California sustained the
award and the United States Supreme Court held that California
could apply its own law.
In attempting to solve this problem the courts have been con-
fused by apparent analogies to the problem of what law deter-
1 (March 11, 1935) 55 S. Ct. 518.
2 For earlier articles see Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the Conflict
of Laws (1926) 11 Minn. L. Rev. 329 and Angell, Recovery under Work-
men's Compensation Acts for Injury Abroad (1918) 31 Hare. L. Rev. 619.
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mines liability for a tort3 and the problem of what law determines
the validity of a contract.4 When the employer-employee relation
was entered into in their own state and the employee was injured
outside of it many courts apply their own law.5 When the em-
ployee was injured in their own state and the contract of em-
ployment was entered into elsewhere, many courts again apply
their own law.6 Thus it is possible for the employee to recover
3 Johnson v. Nelson (1915) 128 Minn. 158, 150 N. W. 620; American Mu-
tual Liability Ins. Co. v. McCaffrey et al. (C. C. A. 5, 1930) 37 Fed. (2d)
870.
4Pettiti v. T. J. Pardy Construction Co. (1925) 103 Conn. 101, 130 Atl.
70. See also most of the cases cited in note 5, post.
a Rounsaville v. Central R. 'R. Co. (1915) 87 N. J. L. 371, 94 Atl. 392,
reversed in (1917) 90 N. J. L. 176, 101 Atl. 182 on other grounds; Kenner-
son v. Thames Towboat Co. (1915) 89 Conn. 367, 94 At. 372; Grinnell v.
Wilkinson (1916) 39 R. I. 447, 98 Atl. 103; Gooding v. Ott (1916) 77 W. Va.
487, 87 S. E. 862; Matter of Post v. Burger & Gohlke (1916) 216 N. Y. 544,
111 N. E. 351; Foughty v. Ott (1917) 80 W. Va. 88, 92 S. E. 143; Klein v.
Stoller & Cook Co. (1917) 220 N. Y. 670, 116 N. E. 1055, memo. opinion;
Fitzpatrick v. Blackall & Baldwin Co. et al. (1917) 220 N. Y. 671, 116 N. E.
1044, memo. opinion; Industrial Com. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1918) 64 Colo.
480, 174 Pac. 589; State ex rel. Chambers et al. v. District Court (1918) 139
Minn. 205, 166 N. W. 185; State ex rel. Maryland Casualty Co. v. District
Court (1918) 140 Minn. 427, 168 N. W. 177; Pierce v. Bekins Van & Storage
Co. (1919) 185 Ia. 1346, 172 N. W. 191; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co.
(1919) 169 Wis. 106, 170 N. W. 275, 171 N. W. 935; Crane v. Leonard,
Crossette & Riley (1921) 214 Mich. 218, 183 N. W. 204; Hospers v. J. Hun-
gerford Smith Co. et al. (1921) 230 N. Y. 616, 130 N. E. 916, memo. opinion;
Hulswit v. Escanaba Mfg. Co. (1922) 218 Mich. 331, 188 N. W. 411; Mc-
Guire v. Phelan-Shirley Co. (1924) 111 Neb. 609, 197 N. W. 615; Pettiti v.
T. J. Pardy Construction Co., supra, note 4, overruling Banks v. Howlett
Co. (1918) 92 Conn. 368, 102 Atl. 822; Krekelberg v. M. A. Floyd Co.
et al. (1926) 166 Minn. 149, 207 N. W. 193; State ex rel. Brewen-Clark
Syrup Co. v. Missouri Workmen's Compensation Com. (1928) 320 Mo.
893, 8 S. W. (2d) 897. Contra Johnson v. Nelson (1915) 128 Minn.
158, 150 N. W. 620; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co. (1918) 224 N. Y. 9,
119 N. E. 878; Altman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau
(1923) 50 N. D. 215, 195 N. W. 287; Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co.
(1930) 156 Miss. 567, 126 So. 395; Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co. (1930)
252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622, semble.
6 American Radiator Co. v. Rogge (1914) 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85, 94
Atl. 85, affirmed 87 N. J. L. 314, 93 Atl. 1083, writ of error dismissed for
want of jurisdiction 245 U. S. 630, 38 S. Ct. 63, 62 L. ed. 520; Davidheiser
v. Hay Foundry & Iron Works (1915) 87 N. J. L. 688, 94,Atl. 309; West
Jersey Trust Co. v. Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. (1915) 88 N. J. L. 102, 95
Atl. 753, reversed 90 N. J. L. 730, 101 Atl. 1055 on another ground; Douth-
wright v. Champlin (1917) 91 Conn. 524, 100 At. 97; Banks v. Howlett Co.
(1918) 92 Conn. 368, 102 Atl. 822, overruled in Pettiti v. T. J. Pardy Con-
struction Co., supra, note 4; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co. (1921) 119
Me. 552, 112 Atl. 516; Farr v. Lumber Co. (1921) 182 N. C. 725, 109 S. E.
833; American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. McCaffrey et al., supra, note 3.
Contra, Barnhart v. American Concrete Steel Co. (1920) 227 N. Y. 531,
125 N. E. 675; Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polish Co. (1923) 99 Conn. 457,
121 Atl. 821; Hall v. Industrial Com. (1925) 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. 1073;
Scott v. White Eagle Oil & Refining Co. (D. C. Kan. 1930) 47 Fed. (2d) 615.
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in both states.7 In Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co.,8 New York
repudiated the contract theory. Justice Cardozo said that the
law which determined the employee's right to compensation and
the employer's duty to pay it was the law governing the em-
ployer-employee relation.9 While this represents the farthest
advance in judicial reasoning on this problem it still leaves us
in the dark as to how to ascertain what law governs the em-
ployer-employee relation. Attempting to apply this test in a
later case 0 in the same jurisdiction, Judge Lehman said that it
meant the law of the state in which the employee did most of
his work.
For the purpose of analysis let us take a hypothetical case.
Suppose the employer is an individual who is at all times in
California and the employee's work is entirely in Alaska." Obvi-
ously the employer is subject to California law and the employee
to Alaska law. Alaska cannot apply its laws extraterritorially to
7 DeGray v. Miller Bros. Construction Co. (Vt. 1934) 173 Atl. 556, hold-
ing, however, that recovery in Connecticut when the contract of employ-
ment was entered into estopped the employee from recovering again in
Vermont. The employee's prior recovery in Connecticut was held to bar
the employer from recovering from the insurance carrier which had in-
sured it against liability under the Vermont act. Minto v. Hitchings & Co.
et al. (1923) 204 App. Div. 661, 198 N. Y. Sup. 610, also holding employee
estopped by prior recovery under the New Jersey Act. In the following
cases the amount recovered in the first state was allowed as a credit on
the award obtained in the second. Jenkins v. T. Hogan & Sons Inc. (1917)
177 App. Div. 36, 163 N. Y. Sup. 707; Gilbert v. DesLauriers Column Mould
Co. Inc. et al. (1917) 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. Sup. 274; Anderson v.
Jarrett Chambers Co. (1924) 210 App. Div. 543, 206 N. Y. Sup. 458, re-
pudiating the estoppel theory. In Hughey v. Ware et al. (1929) 34 N. M.
29, 276 Pac. 27, the petition was dismissed apparently because the recov-
ery under the New Mexico law would be less than what had already been
recovered under the Texas law and therefore finding it unnecessary to
decide between the estoppel theory and the credit theory.8 Supra, note 5. See also note 19 post.
9 "The duty to insure does not outlast the existence within our borders
of the business or relation which calls it into life." 224 N. Y. 9, 12.
10 Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., supra, note 5.
Five cases have been found presenting this fact situation except that
in none of them does it appear where the employer was at the time the
employee received his injury. Three apply the law of the state in whose
territory the employment relation was entered into. Grinnel v. Wilkinson,
supra, note 5; State ex rel, Maryland Casualty Co. v. District Court, supra,
note 5; Hughey v. Ware et al., supra, note 7. One proceeds upon a tort
theory and applies the law of the place of injury. Johnson v. Nelson, upra,
note 3. Another applies the law of the place of injury because the state in
which the contract was entered into interpreted its statute as not applying
to injuries received outside of the state and thus the employee would
otherwise be left to the inadequate common law remedies. Douthwright v.
Champlin, supra, note 6.
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compel the employer to pay or insure. The only law to which the
employer is subject is California law and as long as he remains
there it is the only law which can compel him to pay. Obviously,
then, if the employee is to have any right to compensation for an
injury received in the course of his employment, it must be con-
ferred by the California law.
At this point there may be a doubt as to whether or not the
California legislature intended to confer rights upon employees
in other states. Where the statute did not expressly confer rights
on employees injured outside of the state, a few courts have held
that the legislature did not intend to confer such rights.1 2 In
most of these states the legislature promptly amended the act to
make it apply to out of state employees. 3 Since no other law can
confer rights upon out of state employees of local individual
employers the statute should be construed to apply to them in the
absence of an express provision. Most state courts have so inter-
preted their statutes.' Many statutes expressly so provide.5
If we vary the facts and assume that the employer is a cor-
poration incorporated or doing business in California and there-
fore subject to its jurisdiction but also doing business in and
subject to the jurisdiction of Alaska where the employee is at
work, what law is the employer-employee relation subject to?
Surely in this situation the relation cannot be thought of as ex-
isting between an employer in California and an employee in
Alaska. Both employer and employee are at the time the em-
ployee is injured subject to Alaska law. Alaska having jurisdic-
tion over the corporation can compel it to pay. True, California
12 Tomalin v. S. Pearson & Son, Ltd. (1909) 2 K. B. 61, 100 L. T. R.
685; In re Gould (1913) 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693; North Alaska
Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 174 Cal. 1, 162 Pac. 93; Union Bridge Co.
v. Industrial Com. (1919) 287 Ill. 396, 122 N. E. G09.
ia General Laws of Mass. 1932, Vol. I, c. 152, sec. 26; Smith-Hurd Ill.
Rev. St. 1931, c. 48, sec. 142; General Laws of California, 1931, Vol. II,
Act 4749, sec. 58.
14 Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., supra, note 5; Matter of Post v.
Burger & Gohlke, supra, note 5; State ex. rel. Chambers et al. v. District
Court, supra, note 5; Industrial Coin. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra, note 5;
Pierce v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., supra, note 5; Anderson v. Miller Scrap
Iron Co., supra, note 5; Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, supra, note 5.
'15 Revised Statutes of Missouri 1929, see. 3310; Compiled Laws of Mich-
igan 1929, Vol. II, sec. 8458; Code of Tennessee 1932, Sec. 6870. The
Missouri statute applies not only to injuries received outside of the state
under contract of employment made in the state but also to all injuries
received in the state regardless of where the contract of employment was
entered into. See also the statutes referred to in note 13 supra.
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also has jurisdiction over the corporation but it should not be
permitted to impose duties upon the corporation because of rela-
tions which exist between it in other states and its employees
there.16 It is submitted that in this case the employer-employee
relation is governed by the law of Alaska.
In Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co.17 a corporation in-
corporated in Tennessee and one Tidwell entered into a contract
of employment in Tennessee by the terms of which the employee
agreed to work for the company in Tennessee and other states.
Tidwell was killed while erecting a tank in Ohio. His widow
applied to the Industrial Commission of Ohio for compensation
under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Law. The corporation
appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission. The Commission ruled against the corporation and
awarded the widow $4910.64. which was paid to her out of the
state insurance fund. The corporation had complied with the
Tennessee Workmen's Compensation Act under which the com-
pensation would have been $2200.00, but not with the Ohio law.
Under the Ohio law the state was given a right of action over
against the employer for reimbursement. Ohio invoked the origi-
nal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States and
brought its action for reimbursement there against the corpora-
tion. Judgment was for the plaintiff.
In this case the Supreme Court reaches just the opposite con-
clusion from that arrived at in the instant case and in Bradford
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper18 which it followed. It held that the
law governing the employer-employee relation was Ohio law dis-
tinguishing Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper on the ground
that the Tennessee law as interpreted by the Supreme Court of
Tennessee did not bar recovery in other states as the Vermont
statute in that case had. The distinction is untenable because it
assumes that a state by statute can prevent another state from
applying its own law to a relation between parties over whom it
has jurisdiction.
16 Cf. St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas (1922) 260 U. S. 346,
43 S. Ct. 125 67 L. ed. 297, where Justice Holmes said: "It is true that the
state may regulate the activities of foreign corporations within the state
but it cannot regulate or interfere with what they do outside."; and Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 U. S. 542, 34 S. Ct. 955 58 L. ed. 1457.
By a parity of reasoning it cannot interfere with their relations outside.
17 (1933) 289 U. S. 439, 53 S. Ct. 663 77 L. ed. 1307.
18 (1932) 286 U. S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571; 76 L. ed. 1026.
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If at the time the employee was injured the parties, and there-
fore the employer-employee relation, were subject to the law of
Alaska, it is a denial of full faith and credit not to recognize it
and unfair and a denial of due process of law to apply any other
law.
The decision, as was that in Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, is based on the fallacy that the law of the state in which
the contract is completed enters into and becomes a part of the
contract. This is not true. 9 The contract merely creates the
employer-employee relation to which the law of a particular state
may or may not apply and the question is to what law was it
subject at the time the employee was injured.20 If the statute
in the state in which the contract of employment was entered
into was repealed after the contract of employment had been
entered into but prior to the time when the employee was injured,
no one would suppose that the right to compensation and the
duty to pay it regardless of fault would remain a term of the
contract.21 The statute is clearly not a part of the contract where
it is entered into prior to the enactment of the statute.22 The
place where the relation was formed cannot determine the law
to which it is subject at a later time when it exists elsewhere.23
It cannot matter that the statute is of the so-called elective type.
All of these statutes are compulsory and the election given to the
employer is a choice between a limited liability for all injuries
regardless of fault and the more onerous unlimited liability for
negligence without benefit of the common law defenses.24 The
contract theory will not work in the large number of cases where
29Ala. Great So. Rd. Co. v. Carroll (1892) 97 Ala. 126, 135; North
Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, supra, note 12; Smith v. Heine Safety
Boiler Co., supra, note 5; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., supra, note 6;
Altman v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, supra, note 5;
Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., supra, note 5; Angell, Recovery under
Workten's Compensation Acts for Injury Abroad, 31 Harv. L. Rev. 619,
630-636. See also Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., supra, note 5, where
Judge Rosenberry refutes this argument, but nevertheless falls into the
error of holding that the law of the place where the contract was made
governs.
20 See the Alabama case in note 19 supra.
21 See the same Alabama case in note 19 supra. The entire analysis of
this problem will be found in Judge McClellan's opinion, the force and
clarity of which has never been equalled.
22 Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., supra, note 5.
22 See again the Alabama case in note 19 supra.
24 Note 37 Harv. L. Rev. 375, 376.
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the employment is at will,25 i. e. where the employee does agree
to work for any fixed period of time and the employer does
not agree to employ the worker for any specified term. In these
cases there is no contract 26 yet the employer-employee relation
exists.
In the instant case Justice Stone remarks upon the hardship
on the claimant of compelling him to return to Alaska to prose-
cute his claim especially when the witnesses had probably been
returned to California too. This assumes what is not true. The
Alaska law provides for suit in a court, the action is transitory
and could be brought in a court in California.27 The Supreme
Court has held provisions like the one in the Alaska law, limiting
actions under the act to the courts of Alaska except where service
in Alaska is impossible, contrary to the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and void.28 It is submitted that
rights arising under the laws of the commission type are also
transitory. The only case in which the point has arisen is Logan
v. Missouri Valley Bridge & Iron Co. 29 The Arkansas Supreme
29 (1923) 157 Ark. 528, 249 S. W. 21.
Court said the action was transitory but that the Oklahoma law
had provided no machinery by which it could be enforced in
Arkansas. This reason for refusing to enforce the foreign right
is absurd. The Oklahoma legislature could not set up law en-
forcement machinery in Arkansas. It is submitted that a court
of equity can administer periodic payments, retain the cause for
subsequent adjustments where that is necessary and make any
25 For cases in which the employment was at will, see Johnson v. Nelson,
supra, note 3; Krekelberg v. M. A. Floyd Co. et al., supra, note 5.
26 1 Mechem on Agency, 2d ed., sec. 592.
27 Texas Pipe Line Co. v. Ware (C. C. A. 8, 1926, Kenyon, J.) 15 Fed.
(2d) 171, cert. den. 273 U. S. 742, 71 L. ed. 869, 47 S. Ct. 335; United
Dredging Co. et al. v. Lindberg et al. (C. C. A. 5, 1927) 18 Fed. (2d) 453,
cert. den. 274 U. . 759, 71 L. ed. 1337, 47 S. Ct. 769; Floyd v. Vicksburg
Cooperage Co., supra, note 5. In all of these cases the foreign law enforced
was the Louisiana statute which provided for recovery by suit in a court.
Contra, Lehman v. Ramo Films Inc. (1915) 92 Misc. 418, 155 N. Y. Sup.
1032; Verdicchio v. McNab & Harlin Mfg. Co. (1917) 178 App. Div. 48,
164 N. Y. Sup. 290; Mosely v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co. (1925) 313 Mo. 225,
281 S. W. 762; Johnson v. Carolina C. & 0. Ry. Co. (1926) 191 N. C. 75
131 S. E. 390; Lee v. Chemical Constr. Co. (1931) 200 N. C. 319, 156 S.
E. 848.2 8 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry Co. v. Sowers (1909) 213 U. S. 55,
29 S. Ct. 397, 53 L. ed. 695; Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. George (1914)
233 U. S. 354, 34 S. Ct. 587, 58 L. ed. 997.
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award that the foreign commission could.3 1 All that was said in
Slater v. Mexican National Railroad Co31 was that a court of
In conclusion it is submitted that the law governing the em-
ployer-employee relation is, in the case of individual employers,
the law of the state in which the employer is at the time the em-
ployee is injured and, in the case of corporate employers, the law
of the state in which the employee is at the time he receives his
injury. In the latter class of cases, the Supreme Court should
follow its decision in Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co.32
and overrule its decisions in Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper33 and the instant case.
15 Supra note 18. Professor Beale also thinks this case should be over-
ruled, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 620.
30 Floyd v. Vicksburg Cooperage Co., supra, note 5.
31 (1904) 194 U. S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 281, 48 L. ed. 900.
law could not do so.
-2 Supra note 17.
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